The New Caliphs
U.S. and Britain Seek a Free Hand in Iraq

Common sense demands that the U.N.'s weapons inspectors return to Iraq without any further delay. As Tony Blair reaffirmed recently, the threat thought to be posed by Iraqi weapons was the principal reason for launching the war. Without independent, international verification of Iraq's capability, any future U.S. and British evidence showing their action to be justified may not be believed, as Britain's former U.N. envoy, Sir Crispin Tickell, trenchantly noted yesterday.

The U.S. argument that security concerns prevent the U.N.'s return will not wash; its own search teams have been at work for weeks, although they have found nothing of any great significance. Suspicions thus gain ground that Washington and London exaggerated the WMD threat for political purposes, that their intelligence was either faulty or used selectively, and that they now have something to hide. John Negroponte, the U.S. ambassador to the U.N., says blithely that Washington sees no role for U.N. inspectors in the foreseeable future. In this, Britain, swallowing private misgivings, appears ready to acquiesce. Despite the centrality of the WMD issue, no mention is made of resumed inspections in the sweeping new U.S.-British security council resolution. No ground is given to Russia's demand that Hans Blix's work be completed before the council finally lifts sanctions and surrenders its powers. What an irony, and what a disgrace, that after years of complaining about Saddam's obstruction of inspections, the U.S. is now itself obstructing them.

The new joint draft resolution is in other respects a deeply unsatisfactory document. Common sense again suggests that the U.N. should be afforded a leading role, as in Afghanistan, in facilitating the creation of a post-Saddam system of governance. Impartial U.N. mediators would be far better positioned to instil confidence, among Iraqis and in the wider region, in a process that will at best be complex and arduous. The contrary U.S.-British intention to direct political reform via a new legal entity, the "Authority", controlled by them, and with only an advisory, non-executive role for a U.N. "special coordinator" is ill-conceived and potentially divisive.

The resolution envisages a similarly tight U.S.-British grip, also for at least one year, on exploitation of and revenue from Iraq's oil once U.N. controls, specifically the oil-for-food programme, are phased out. The proposed international oversight by a board of absentee luminaries drawn from the U.N., IMF and World Bank is no real safeguard against the sort of abuse E.U. commissioner Poul Nielson warned about yesterday. Nor is it responsible to assume that the 60% of Iraqis who rely on U.N.-administered food aid will soon be able to do without it. While the U.S. and Britain now - finally - accept their obligations under international law, what this resolution boils down to is legitimisation of an illegal war and of an open-ended occupation. It gives them a free hand in Iraq. What it will give Iraqis is much less clear.

The U.S. and Britain anticipate less determined opposition at the U.N. than was the case before the war. Perhaps their calculations will be proved wrong again. Whatever the outcome, Mr Blair still has a lot of explaining to do. Where is the "vital role" for the U.N. that he promised at Hillsborough? This most definitely is not it. Has he been strung along again by George Bush? It seems that way. Can the U.S. therefore be trusted on the related matter of the Middle East peace process? Just how long will Britain stay in Iraq? And where are the weapons for which the war was ostensibly fought?