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back to: Special Articles
The Federalist Papers


Forword...
The Federalist Papers are a collection of articles that were published by newspapers in New York from late 1787 through early 1788. Published originally under the pseudonym PUBLIUS, these eighty-five essays were written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James Madison, to explain the benefits of the proposed Constitution to the people and to defend it against its many critics.
So what did this new constitution do? Our first constitution was a bill called the Articles of Confederation. These were written in 1776-77 just after the colonies declared independence from Great Britain. The Continental Congress was, at that time, the only institution of federal government. The Articles of Confederation formalized this situation and provided a weak framework under which the colonies could jointly prosecute the Revolutionary War. Passed by the 2nd Continental Congress in 1777, the Articles were not ratified by the colonies until March of 1781, seven months before the end of the war.
The Articles formed the basis of a confederation of states. They required a protection of trade among them, and the free movement of citizens and goods. They required a common defense, and that states should not form alliances that might damage other states or the federation. However, the Continental Congress had no means to raise funds to conduct its business. The Articles gave no authority for taxation except with regard to a federally regulated postal system. Though the Congress was charged with providing for the common defense, it could only request quotas of troops from the states. The states frequently could not or would not comply. General George Washington complained repeatedly that the Congress did not adequately support the army of the Revolutionary War.
The revolutionary war did, apparently, provide just enough commonality of purpose to keep the States working together. Following the war things began to deteriorate very quickly. England and Spain, both in control of large naval forces, were interfering with trade. They were preventing the transport of goods by sea not only to and from Europe but from state to state by coastal waters. They were in the habit of ignoring the federal government and manipulating one state against another. Not only was the national government unable to raise money to enforce its legislation and will, it was in debt and unable to pay. In order to support the revolutionary war, the various states and the federal government had borrowed money or goods from wealthy merchants. Following the war, the federal government also borrowed money from Holland, France, and from several of the states in order to rebuild.
The United States needed standards of weights and measures and a standard currency in order to avoid unscrupulous speculation and predatory tricks based on uneven standards across state borders. How could the economy of the new nation be stabilized if each state government could print and issue its own script on a whim?
Supporters of the new Constitution felt that there was no choice but to strengthen the federal government, enabling it to raise funds to pay off debts and improve the United States standing among nations. The common defense would include regulation of territorial waters & thus the federal government would have to build a Navy to control the behavior of England, Spain, France, and Holland regarding shipping traffic along the coast. The radical idea, a federation of independent states, had not yet been realized in a form that would be stable and long lasting. The new Constitution was an effort to answer these many problems and to establish a framework for a new kind of government that would be self-regulating and long-lasting.
Federalist No. 1- General Introduction
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 2- Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
- For the Independent Journal
- JAY
Federalist No. 3- Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- JAY
Federalist No. 4- Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- JAY
Federalist No. 5- Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- JAY
Federalist No. 6- Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 7- Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 8- The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, November 20, 1787
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 9- The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 10- The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, November 23, 1787
- MADISON
Federalist No. 11- The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a Navy
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 12- The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, November 27, 1787
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 13- Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 14- Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, November 30, 1787
- MADISON
Federalist No. 15- The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 16- The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, December 4, 1787
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 17- The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 18- The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON and MADISON
Federalist No. 19- The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON and MADISON
Federalist No. 20- The Insufficiency fo the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, December 11, 1787
- HAMILTON and MADISON
Federalist No. 21- Other Defects of the Present Confederation
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 22- Other Defects of the Present Confederation (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, December 14, 1787
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 23- The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, December 18, 1787
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 24- The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 25- The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, December 21, 1787
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 26- The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 27- The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, December 25, 1787
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 28- The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the Common Defense Considered (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 29- Concerning the Militia
- From the Daily Advertiser
- Thursday, January 10, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 30- Concerning the General Power of Taxation
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, December 28, 1787
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 31- Concerning the General Power of Taxation (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, January 1, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 32- Concerning the General Power of Taxation (cont)
- From the Daily Advertiser
- Thursday, January 3, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 33- Concerning the General Power of Taxation (cont)
- From the Daily Advertiser
- January 3, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 34- Concerning the General Power of Taxation (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, January 4, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 35- Concerning the General Power of Taxation (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 36- Concerning the General Power of Taxation (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday January 8, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 37- Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper Form of Government
- From the Daily Advertiser
- Friday, January 11, 1788
- MADISON
Federalist No. 38- Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention (cont), and the Incoherence of the Objections to the New Plan Exposed
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, January 15, 1788
- MADISON
Federalist No. 39- The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
- For the Independent Journal
- MADISON
Federalist No. 40- The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined and Sustained
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, January 18, 1788
- MADISON
Federalist No. 41- General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
- For the Independent Journal
- MADISON
Federalist No. 42- The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, January 22, 1788
- MADISON
Federalist No. 43- The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- MADISON
Federalist No. 44- Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, January 25, 1788
- MADISON
Federalist No. 45- The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered
- For the Independent Journal
- MADISON
Federalist No. 46- The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, January 29, 1788
- MADISON
Federalist No. 47- The Particular Structure of the New Government and the Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, February 1, 1788
- MADISON
Federalist No. 48- These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No Constitutional Control Over Each Other
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, February 1, 1788
- MADISON
Federalist No. 49- Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a Convention
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, February 5, 1788
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 50- Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, February 5, 1788
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 51- The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks and Balances Between the Different Departments
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, February 8, 1788
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 52- The House of Representatives
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, February 8, 1788
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 53- The House of Representatives (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, February 12, 1788
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 54- The Apportionment of Members Among the States
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, February 12, 1788
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 55- The Total Number of the House of Representatives
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, February 15, 1788
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 56- The Total Number of the House of
- Representatives (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, February 19, 1788
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 57- The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, February 19, 1788
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 58- Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered
- MADISON
Federalist No. 59- Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, February 22, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 60- Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, February 26, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 61- Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, February 26, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 62- The Senate
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 63- The Senate (cont)
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON or MADISON
Federalist No. 64- The Powers of the Senate
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, March 7, 1788
- JAY
Federalist No. 65- The Powers of the Senate (cont)
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, March 7, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 66- Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, March 11, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 67- The Executive Department
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, March 11, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 68- The Mode of Electing the President
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, March 14, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 69- The Real Character of the Executive
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, March 14, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 70- The Executive Department Further Considered
- From the New York Packet
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 71- The Duration in Office of the Executive
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, March 18, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 72- The Duration in Office (cont), and Re-Eligibility of the Executive Considered
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, March 21, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 73- The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, March 21, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 74- The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning
- Power of the Executive
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, March 25, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 75- The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
- For the Independent Journal
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 76- The Appointing Power of the Executive
- From the New York Packet
- Tuesday, April 1, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 77- The Appointing Power (cont), and Other Powers of the Executive Considered
- From the New York Packet
- Friday, April 4, 1788
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 78- The Judiciary Department
- From McLEAN's Edition, New York
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 79- The Judiciary (cont)
- From McLEAN's Edition, New York
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 80- The Powers of the Judiciary
- From McLEAN's Edition, New York
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 81- The Judiciary (cont), and the Distribution of the Judicial Authority
- From McLEAN's Edition, New York
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 82- The Judiciary (cont)
- From McLEAN's Edition, New York
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 83- The Judiciary (cont), in Relation to Trial by Jury
- From McLEAN's Edition, New York
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 84- Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered
- From McLEAN's Edition, New York
- HAMILTON
Federalist No. 85- Concluding Remarks
- From McLEAN's Edition, New York
- HAMILTON
Afterword...
It would seem that the instruments of government established by our constitution, the bargain that was struck in order to assure a solid future for the United States, has done what was intended and perhaps more than the drafters could have wished. The world has changed dramatically since 1791. It is interesting to count the number of revolutions that have taken place since our founding fathers argued in a hall in Philadelphia. But it is also instructive to look at what has not changed. Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Madison both took great pains to explore the problems presented by the disparity of property and influence in revolutionary America. Mr. Hamilton argued that it was only right that the wealthy and powerful should control government unconditionally. He said:
"All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well-born, the other the mass of people. The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct permanent share in the government."
Hamilton even went so far as to propose at the Constitutional Convention that the President and the Senate be seated for life. While the members of the convention did not accept this notion, it is important to remember that we do not popularly elect our President. We have a popular vote that is supposedly reflected by the Electoral College. The electoral college has been infused with the power of our political party system from the beginning. Neither was the Senate elected by popular vote (until the 17th amendment changed this provision) but by appointment via the state legislatures. Great pains were taken to establish a system where the "mass of people" could feel that they were participating in government but where popular passion would never dictate hasty action.
Mr. Madison was more agnostic in his consideration of the basis of power. He belonged to a group known as the "Jeffersonians" who were driven by concern for the problems of unequal distribution of property and wealth:
"So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government."
It is this very dichotomy between Hamilton and Madison (which is not represented very strongly in the Federalist Papers because they were after all an argument for the new constitution) that informed the first generation of national leaders in the United States. The first political parties were the Federalist Party and the Democratic-Republican Party.
The Federalist Party, represented by the likes of Mr. Hamilton, George Washington, and John Adams, was comfortable with the old-world social class system & supported an executive with nearly dictatorial powers. Critics charged that Washington and Adams, the first two Presidents, were too concerned with pomp and honors attending the office and that they were too quick to mount a horse and enforce their will on the people. It appears there was reason to feel that these Presidents, and the cabinets that they appointed, intended powers similar to those of a monarch. The Democratic Republicans were taken with a vision of The Enlightenment and felt that power devolved solely to the people. Thomas Jefferson - author of The Declaration of Independence, and our third President - was the intellectual leader of this group. He was deeply suspicious of any act or ceremony that saw the Federal government as a ruler, rather than as servant, of the people.
So it was that this new constitution left many things unresolved. It would take decades of political strife and sometimes physical conflict to iron out the ultimate character of our federal government and its uneasy relations with the states.
We frequently hear references to these essays and their authors employed on the floor of the House of Representatives as we grapple with the course our federal pact has taken in the last two hundred plus years. It is important to note that these essays, and indeed the Constitution itself, are not perfect documents of what our governments do, or of what they should do. The men who designed our Constitution understood this: the new constitution was amended within nine months of its ratification by the Bill of Rights (drafted by James Madison). Some people like to insist that the Constitution is an absolute guide, even a divine guide, to the dimensions of our nation and her people. This is certainly not an argument supported by the gentlemen who wrote these essays. They recognized the constitution for what it was: a compromise. Why after all did it establish three distinct branches of government, each with powers both general & discreet, to counteract the danger of corruption presented by so much power? Why did it provide for amendment, authority for which was distributed to the states?
Our constitution has been amended twenty-seven times since it was ratified in 1791. An examination of the progression of amendments shows that changes are usually related to periods of great social upheaval: the Civil War, rapid economic expansion, the Great Depression, the Civil Rights Movement. While our constitution is a contract of unprecedented stability, clearly we do change it in times of need. Even so, the changes are generally very conservative. The required two-thirds ratification by the states and the diversity of interests and opinion across them are good assurance against any effort to radically alter our form of government by constitutional amendment. While the Constitution itself is a very conservative instrument, the government that it established has been quite dynamic.
We can point to occasions of Judicial activism, Legislative activism, or Executive activism in our nation's history. Activism on the part of the President is something we expect. We see this as a sign of leadership and we appreciate it, so long as the authority of the office is tempered by the Legislature and the Judiciary. Legislative activism is more rare, typically driven by response to the executive - either supportive or reactive. Judicial activism is rare indeed. We view such activity with concern, for the Judiciary serves a traditional role as the very bastion of conservatism. During the Civil Rights movement, the Supreme Court sought to enforce certain of its findings through the use of executive power. It was able to do so, but at the cost of such outrage & controversy that these actions are still debated regularly more than thirty years later.
© Tom Kindig - LeftJustified Publiks

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